



Leveraging 'Choice' to Automate Authorization Hook Placement




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
The Problem

- ❖ Servers **manage resources** on behalf of multiple, mutually-distrusting clients.
- ❖ Must interface with an **authorization policy** that determines whether a client request to access a resource is allowed.
 - ❖ Place **authorization hooks** to mediate all security-sensitive operations on shared resources.
- ❖ Largely **manual efforts** till date (X server, postgresql, gconf, dbus, etc)
 - ❖ Informal analysis of server code and discussions on developer forums.
 - ❖ Lack of consensus on basic concepts, such as the definition of **what constitutes a security-sensitive operation**.
 - ❖ No tool support to identify their occurrence in large code-bases.
- ❖ Prior efforts: Require training wheels that still necessitates **detailed understanding of the server's code base**.
- ❖ How do we automate this?

User 'Choice'



Design



Definitions

Tainted Variable: The set of tainted variables $V_T(P)$ is the transitive closure of the relation data-dependence relation (\mathcal{D}) from the user request variables $V_I(P)$.

Security sensitive object: A variable is security sensitive ($v \in V_S(P)$) if any following are true:

- If it is assigned a value from a container via a lookup function using a variable $v \in V_T(P)$,
- If \mathcal{D} is true for some $v' \in V_S(P)$,
- If it is a global variable and in the set $V_T(P)$.

Operation: An operation is a subgraph of the Control Dependence Graph rooted at dummy node. If a dummy node's control statement is predicated on a variable in $V_T(P)$, then the operation rooted at the dummy node is a user-choice operation


Security sensitive operation: A operation is security-sensitive if it is a user-choice operation and it allows the user to access a variable in $V_S(P)$.

Example

```
int ChangeWindowProperty(ClientPtr *c,
    WindowPtr *w, int mode)
{
    WindowPtr *win;
    PropertyPtr *pProp;
    err = LookupWin(&win, stuff->window, c);
    rc = LookupProperty(&pProp, win, stuff->property, c);
    if (rc == BadMatch)
    {
        /* Op 1 */
        pProp->name = property;
        pProp->format = format;
        pProp->data = data;
        pProp->size = len;
    }
    else
    {
        /* Op 2 */
        if (mode == REPLACE)
        {
            /* Op 2.1 */
            pProp->data = data;
            pProp->size = len;
            pProp->format = format;
        }
        else if (mode == APPEND)
        {
            /* Op 2.2 */
            pProp->data = data;
            pProp->size += len;
        }
    }
}

```

Hook Placement



Results

Program	X Server	postgres	pennmush	memcached
LOC	28k	49k	78k	9k
Total variables	7795	12350	24372	2350
Tainted variables	2975 (38%)	5100 (41%)	4168 (17%)	490 (20%)
Security sensitive variables	823 (10%)	402 (3%)	1573 (6%)	82 (3%)
Data Structures	404	278	311	41
Sensitive Data structures	61 (15%)	30 (10%)	38 (12%)	7 (17%)
User-choice Operations	4760	5063	6485	996
Sensitive operations	1382 (29%)	1378 (27%)	1382 (21%)	203 (20%)
Hooks	532 (11%)	579 (11%)	714 (11%)	56 (5%)